As I understand it, Spinoza lays out a very deterministic universe, and everything that happens, happens necessarily. So when immense amount of suffering and anxiety happen around us, we should cast indifference towards it, so as not to partake of the suffering, and damaging our joy in the world.

Now, since these things happen necessarily, at what point to we regard this as something needing to change. The general idea being, since, say a puppy is suffering, and it causes me suffering to see it suffer, should I then try to undo the suffering of the puppy to mitigate my suffering, or just withdraw myself from the suffering altogether.

Does that make a lick of sense?

I may be wrong, but I think Spinoza's worldview is one wherein absolute necessity rules, and therefore things such as 'suffering' might very well be something we imagine. He has some confusing ways of talking about things, where he seems to say we *can* be distinct, but not really, but talks about it anyway... so who knows.

But I think that if we take his view seriously - as in explicitly as he states it - we would look at the change for which some would struggle as necessary within the system (i.e. God). So, I always use the analogy of an individual's body being all there is in existence. It seems to me that Spinoza's view, on this analogy, would be something like this: in the same way that, when our body functions efficiently, it will counter viruses and bacteria with the appropriate functions and kill such things off, so too will humans (modes) counter suffering or unpleasant things in the world. But on Spinoza's view, the analogous body (i.e. everything) would be absolutely efficient, so although viruses would arise, the cells would always function accordingly. (This is what I tried alluding to by saying his universe is symmetrical.) In this sense, when applied to how we view the world, one could still, say, participate in a revolution or corruption, but it would necessitate the converse.

So, maybe I'm wrong (this is just how I've been reading it), but it seems, then, that on Spinoza's view, that there will be no Buddhistic enlightenment which one can attain by withdrawing from the world. Rather, on Spinoza's view, such a withdrawal will just be the way some of these modes react to the whole, others will revolt, and others will play some intermediate role. As long as the whole (God) never changes and always functions by necessity, it will just play out this way infinitely. No enlightenment, no heaven, no withstanding worldview. Given this view, it makes sense for him to say something like: "don't be bogged down by this view like a little bitch who lets the world throw you around like a rag doll; instead, realize that you are part of the action, and participate in it and enjoy it."

So I think - at least given my interpretation of this, which may be way off - you could just make the argument that withdrawing from it all is the *wrong* way, the passive way, whereas fighting for what you believe in, even in a deterministic universe, is the *right* way, the active way. After all, if change *necessarily* must come about by some pre-determined model, it still needs those active people to make it happen. It won't just occur without some interaction between modes and attributes.

I would mention that the words we use to describe things, though necessary, do not have inherent meaning and absolutely no meaning beyond humans. "Suffering," "pain," "apathy," "activity," and the like are functions of language, but the world just is--- necessarily. We may add to the world the various determined concepts and determined imagined causes of things- for we are determined to do so regardless- however these mean nothing to God. God is not purposive, he does not design man to work toward something; from what I gathered Spinoza's God does not even have the capacity to particularly care for human beings. We just are, necessarily, and the way things will go is the way things will go. We can call them unjust, evil, and terrible, but for Spinoza those words only have bearing for the species that understands those symbols as they (that particular species) do.

That raises the question of how to live a meaningful life in the world for sure, but that is beside the point in Part I and II of the Ethics. Those books establish the facts... from there we move into "try to make your life meaningful if you can." Again though, any solution will be a determined response to the facts of the world that only have symbolic value for the species engaged in a struggle. Apathy is still engagement. "One is always responsible for what is made of one," has no bearing for Spinoza. He can say: "Sure Sartre, but one is what one is at any moment necessarily, despite how one is determined to imagine oneself." Responsibility is as far from intelligibility for the intellect as possible, but for the imagination, oh ho! it is the pillar of society.

Yeah, I guess a very crass reduction would be the following:

Look, the seat of consciousness, the ego, that is in Spinozistic terms, the intellect coming to know the various modes of expression, is nothing more than a person riding a roller coaster. An endless one at that. This is to say, you have know say on where the roller coaster goes(the body as the roller coaster car), as it is fixed and determined by the track. One can only realize the totality of all of this, and reject the notion of any type of control over the ride. The only option, then is to simply except the ride.

I think by the time one gets to the end of the Ethics, one can see that his ethics is a rational ethics--in that way, we cannot really find any reason why we would be cruel or even indifferent to other rational beings. Our power, and our perfection, is found in harmony with other rational beings--increasing that which is eternal and multiplying second and third orders of knowledge.

I cannot really see any strong argument for my caring about kicked puppies, except that perhaps such emotional concerns (seeing and feeling the suffering of other beings, not just human beings) bring us into imagination and sensation. So maybe we stop people from kicking puppies so that we are not bothered and confused by emotions (and their passivity) and can focus on reason and intuition.

...or for eating intelligent broccoli.